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Abstract
In the past decade, pirates from Somalia have carried out thousands of attacks on cargo
ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, causing what others have
identified as significant damage to maritime trade. In this paper, we use variations in the
spread and intensity of Somali piracy to estimate its effect on the volume of international
trade. By comparing trade volume changes along shipping routes located in pirate wa-
ters to those that are not, we estimate that Somali piracy reduced bilateral trade passing
through the Gulf of Aden by 1.7-1.9 percent per year from 2000 to 2010. In addition, we
find larger reductions for trade in bulk commodities, which are generally shipped by sea
and are more likely to fall prey to piracy attacks. While our estimates suggest that the
trade costs of piracy are much lower than what has been suggested in the existing liter-
ature, we find that they remain significant and unevenly distributed, with five countries
and the European Union shouldering 70% of the total costs.
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1 Introduction
Maritime piracy around Somalia has emerged over the past two decades as a legitimate threat to
international trade. The combination of weak governmental institutions, a natural geographic
choke point in the Gulf of Aden, and a significant flow of ships through the Gulf has allowed
pirates to establish safe harbors from which to attack a plethora of available targets. Success-
ful attacks have significant consequences: hijacked ships, kidnapped crews, expensive ransom
negotiations, and loss of life. As merchant ships are attacked and trade flows disrupted, the
cost of transporting goods through pirate waters increases, possibly discouraging trade through
these regions. This problem has global dimensions. Annually, we estimate that 12 percent of
world trade is estimated to pass through the Suez Canal and is therefore affected by this threat.
Countries in the Indian Ocean region, whose ports are in relatively close proximity to pirate
waters, ship as much as 60 percent of their imports travel through pirate infested waters. These
countries are potentially exposed to significant trade disruptions, and could be the victims of
pirate-induced price distortions in their traded goods, with consequent welfare implications.
In this paper, we lay out a simple model of bilateral trade where piracy increases trade
costs, and derive an augmented gravity equation to estimate the effect of pirate activity on
trade volumes. Using a global panel data set combining information on bilateral volumes of
trade and on reported pirate attacks, we first study how annual trade between pairs of countries
that transfer goods through pirate infested waters is affected by the intensity of piracy. We
then compare this effect to trade between country pairs that arguably use other shipping lanes
that are free of Somali pirates.
We estimate the cost of piracy in two ways. We first follow the existing literature in measur-
ing pirate activity as the total number of pirate attacks in a given year that took place around
Somalia. This includes successful hijackings and boardings as well as attempted boardings and
cases where a ship was fired upon. A drawback of this estimation strategy is that the number
of attacks could be endogenous to trade for a number of reasons including reverse causality
and omitted factors. For instance, if more ships transit through an area, the probability of an
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encounter mechanically increases. Alternatively, if ships hire (unobserved) protective military
vessels in response to high piracy risks, we could observe fewer attempted attacks, even though
shipping costs would have increased. For this reason, we use the geographic reach of pirates as
a second measure of pirate activity, which has the advantage of being generally unrelated to
the volume and frequency of international trade. From the early 2000s until 2009, Somali pi-
rates significantly improved and refined their equipment and organizational structures, often by
adopting more sophisticated weapon and transportation systems. Technological improvements
have allowed pirates to attack further away from their coastal bases in Somalia, increasing con-
siderably the geographic spread of pirate-infested waters and the amount of time ships spend
transiting through those waters, thus raising trade costs.
We find that piracy originating from Somalia and occurring in or around the Gulf of Aden
significantly reduces trade between county-pairs that ship goods though the Gulf. The reduction
in the volume of bilateral trade due to the increase in attacks and in pirate reach between 2000
and 2010 averages 1.7-1.9 percent per year. This estimate takes into account all tradeable
goods, even those less susceptible to maritime transport. Trade in bulk commodities, which are
almost exclusively shipped by sea and are the most likely to respond to trade frictions because
of their larger elasticity of demand, is estimated to fall an average of 4.1 percent per year.
We also carry out a heterogeneity analysis to study the variation of trade costs along several
relevant dimensions. We find that piracy in the Gulf of Aden reduces trade between countries
that are separated by relatively short distances, but not between countries that are far apart.
This evidence is consistent with shorter routes witnessing a larger relative increase in trade
costs given that a larger fraction of the total distance is traveled through pirate waters. This
is also consistent with more distant country pairs having other routing possibilities that avoid
the Gulf of Aden. When considering which nations are most affected by the piracy problem, we
find that the effect of piracy does not vary systematically with the income of a trading partner.
Applying our estimates to the value of trade moving through the Gulf of Aden suggests that
no country–including those with a significant share of trade moving through Aden–loses more
than 2 percent of trade value because of piracy. However, in our view it would be incorrect
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to conclude that the costs from piracy are negligible. When considering the absolute value of
trade losses, we estimate an average annual loss of $25 billion, with most of that accruing to
a handful of countries. In particular, our estimates suggest that 4 countries and the European
Union shouldered 70% of the total costs of piracy, with the EU in particular losing an annual
$11 billion in trade, or 44 percent of the total cost.
Our paper provides important and robust evidence that the threat of violence and, more
generally, the possibility of disruptions in the transportation network have a negative effect on
trade. In this regard, the paper shares an important commonality with Anderson and Mar-
couiller (2002); Nitsch and Schumacher (2004); Blomberg and Hess (2006); Mirza and Verdier
(2008); De Sousa, Mirza, and Verdier (2008), which find an effect of violence and terrorism on
transnational commerce.
From a methodological viewpoint, our paper adds insights to the gravity equation literature
by emphasizing the role of multilateral resistance terms in estimations of time-varying trade
costs. Since the seminal contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it is well known that
omitting the multilateral resistance terms from gravity estimations leads to biased estimates.
However, due to data limitations or computational constraints, it is not uncommon in panel
datasets to account for the multilateral resistance terms using country rather than country-year
fixed effects. As our results show, this substitution is problematic for time varying trade costs
because of the likely existence of common trends between the uncontrolled time dimension of
a country’s multilateral resistance and the bilateral trade costs.1
Our paper joins an economic literature assessing modern piracy.2 Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller
1The debate on the role of multilateral resistance terms has been central in the “border puzzle” literature,
which focuses on a time invariant trade cost. Other gravity variables of interest, such as bilateral distance or
common language, are also time invariant. So, it is mainly studies that investigate the impact of trade policies
where time-varying trade frictions are the focus. Interestingly, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that once
accounting for country-year fixed effects the effect of free trade agreements on member countries’ trade is five
times larger. This bias correction goes in the opposite direction compared to this paper, which goes to illustrate
the many channels through which the omitted multilateral resistance terms affect the estimates.
2A broader literature has looked at a number of other interesting aspects of Somali piracy that inform our
model and assumptions. For example, de Groot, Rablen, and Shortland (2012) analyze ransom negotiations in
the Somali context and find that observables such as length of imprisonment, size of boat, and nationality of the
crew are all significant determinants of ransom value. Similarly, Ambrus and Chaney (2013) consider ransom
negotiations between Spain and the Barbary pirates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and find that
people in captivity for longer periods were ransomed more cheaply.
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(2012) estimate that the increase in pirate attacks in 2008 caused an increase in shipping costs
between 8 and 13 percent for bulk goods traveling through the Gulf of Aden. Bensassi and
Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2012) study the effect of piracy on the volume of international trade between
Europe and Asia, and find that exports fell by 11 percent for every 10 ships that are hijacked
by pirates from Somalia, Southern or South-Eastern Asia.3 A recent report by the World Bank
(2013) focuses strictly on Somali piracy and, using a methodology similar to ours to identify
trade routes affected by piracy, exploits a difference-in-difference strategy on a sample of 150
countries. The study finds that trade flows of affected countries fell by 7.4 percent after 2006
due to Somali piracy, which corresponds to an increase in trade costs of 0.74 –1.49 percent. We
improve on the strategy in the World Bank report by using a rich structure of regression fixed
effects to account for country-specific changes in the patterns of trade over time (i.e., multilateral
resistance terms), and by using measures of piracy intensity (i.e., number of attacks and pirate
reach) which better capture the significant ramp-up of pirate activity after 2006.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes piracy in the Gulf of
Aden and discusses the mechanisms through which piracy may affect trade volumes and trade
costs. Section 3 lays out the empirical model for bilateral trade. Section 4 describes the data
sources and variable construction, while section 5 presents our results on the impact of piracy
on international trade. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Spread of Somali piracy
Piracy affects a large number of countries in the world, especially around the tropics. The
concentration of piracy in these regions can be seen in Figure 1, which maps all recorded
3Since Bensassi and Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2012) restrict the data and analysis to bilateral trade flows between
Europe and Asia, their analysis relies mostly on the time variation in pirate attacks as a source of model
identification. By considering bilateral trade data from regions trading outside of pirate infested waters, we
effectively construct a reference group against which to compare the fluctuations in trade observed along routes
impacted by piracy, and reduce omitted variable bias. In addition, it is also worth highlighting that while
Bensassi and Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2012) focused on all sources of maritime piracy, their positive results are driven
by pirate hijackings, which are mostly carried out by Somali pirates.
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instances of pirate attacks collected by the International Maritime Bureau from 2000 to 2011.
The Horn of Africa around the Gulf of Aden is the site for a significant number of those
attacks. Other areas with a high frequency of attacks include the Malacca Strait, the Gold
Coast around West Africa, and the Gulf of Bengal. The emergence of widespread piracy events
around Somalia is relatively recent. Figure 2 plots the time series of attacks around the Gulf
of Aden and the Malacca Strait over the period 1991-2011.4 While Indonesian piracy has been
active and relatively constant for at least two decades, Somali piracy did not occur in large
numbers until 2005.5
A key characteristic of Somali piracy is that, in a short amount of time, it has experienced
a significant technological evolution.6 Initially, pirates operated dhows or fishing boats to
assault vessels that came too close to the Somali coast.As commercial vessels improved their
defenses and stayed away from the Horn of Africa, pirates enrolled better arms and faster
and more powerful boats, which allowed them to seek targets further afield (Tsvetkova, 2009).
As operations became more organized and better funded, pirates invested in a “mothership”
strategy involving a large pirate ship serving as a base for a number of speed boats located
deep in the open ocean (Treves, 2009). Upon finding a suitable target, pirates would board the
speedboats and quickly approach and attempt to hijack the target ship. If captured, the vessel
would then be directed to a pirate safe haven in Somalia, where it remained while ransom
negotiations took place (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). The result of this technological
and organizational evolution is that piracy increased dramatically in intensity, violence, and
4While the number of attacks is high by simple count, the larger volume of vessels passing through the
Malacca Strait implies that the ships traveling through that region are less likely to be attacked. While precise
numbers are difficult to find, Evers and Gerke (2006) estimate that more than 50,000 ships travel through the
Malacca Strait each year, with more recent estimates as high as 70,000 ships per year. On the other hand, the
Suez Canal Authority reports indicate that travel through the Canal peaked in 2008 with 21,415 ships.
5Recent reports indicate that piracy is on the decline in Somalia (Saul, 2013). Many observers believe the
ongoing slow down in attacks is due to the presence of navy patrols and enhanced onboard security (World
Bank, 2013). These methods of pirate repression are quite costly; thus, pirate risk is thought to continue to
affect trade even in the absence of a significant number of attacks.
6A broad literature has assessed both the manner in which pirates in general and Somali pirates in particular
operate and the effectiveness of various strategies designed to stop them. While this information is informative
for our econometric modeling and the interpretation of our results, it is not the focus of our analysis. Instead
we invite readers interested in these issues to see Gilpin (2009); Hastings (2009); Coggins (2010); Psarros,
Christiansen, Skjong, and Gravir (2011); Percy and Shortland (2013), and the World Bank report (2013).
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geographic spread. As Figure 3 shows, all reported pirate attacks occurred within 500 kilometers
of the Somali coast until 2003. Starting in 2004, attacks were taking place between 500 and 1,000
kilometers from the coast and, after 2005, some attacks were taking place 1,200 kilometers from
the Somali coast. As the reach of piracy extended further and further into the Indian Ocean,
ships were spending more and more of their travel time in “pirate waters”.7
While both the number of attacks and the geographic spread of piracy were increasing in
the second half of the decade, the timing between the two dimensions of expansion differed
somewhat. Figure 4 graphs the monthly counts of attacks, the distance of the furthest attack
from a Somali port by month and year, and (with a dashed line) the maximum distance in
kilometers away from Somalia that pirates had attacked up to that point–a distance which
we refer to as Reach. The frequency of attacks was at its most intense rate in the 2007-2009
period. On the other hand, the ability of pirates to reach targets increased the fastest in the
2005-2007 period.
2.2 Cost of piracy
Piracy imposes two types of costs on maritime carriers. A direct cost is accrued in the eventual-
ity of pirate capture. Once a ship is captured, it is often driven to the Somali coast where cargo,
crew and ship are taken hostage, often for long periods of time, while a ransom is negotiated.8
Most hijacking cases are resolved with the ship, crew, and cargo being returned to the owner
once the ransom has been paid. Sometimes captured vessels are retained and turned into pirate
mother-ships, or crew members are killed or die in captivity.9
The probability that a hijacking occurs is generally quite small, although not negligible.
7Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is very different from the piracy experienced in the Strait of Malacca. The latter
usually consists of small groups of pirates boarding ships and taking valuables such as cash, personal property,
and other small items. These Malacca pirates tend to act like seagoing burglars, using the threat of violence
to take what they can carry and make a relatively rapid departure. Cases where pirates maintain control of
the ship for an extended period are rare and ransoms are only carried out by the most well developed groups
(Raymond, 2009).
8The average duration from hijacking to ransom payment was 6 months in 2011 (Bellish, 2013).
9Somali pirates are estimated to earn $200 million each year in ransom payments (Besley, Fetzer, and
Mueller, 2012). In 2010 alone, 1181 people were taken hostage (International Maritime Bureau, 2011) with
detention periods lasting up to 1,178 days (World Bank, 2013).
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For example, in 2009, it is estimated that only 0.2 percent of the ships passing through the
Gulf of Aden were boarded by pirates (Gilpin, 2009). Nonetheless, the substantially high costs
of capture impose increased operating costs on all transiting ships. Ships transiting through
pirate waters must pay higher risk premia on insurance, as well as on wages and benefits to
crews as a result of the risk of being attacked, taken hostage, or even killed.10 They must
also engage in other defensive measures such as hiring security forces, increasing travel speed
in pirate waters with consequent increases in fuel use, and modifying ships to make them less
likely to be hijacked (de Groot, Rablen, and Shortland, 2012). Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller
(2012) estimate that shipping costs through the Gulf of Aden have increased by 8-13 percent
following the increase of pirate activity.11
It is important to highlight that Somali pirates are responsible for the great majority of
hijackings, because they have access to safe havens in Somalia where hostage ships and crew
can be held for a prolonged period of time. In contrast, pirates elsewhere lack such safe havens
and must generally limit their activities to theft (Raymond, 2009). It is thus no surprise that
the costs imposed by pirates outside of Somalia has been found to be relatively small. For
instance, Bensassi and Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2013) find that the only form of pirate activity that
affects trade is hijacking, and Besley, Fetzer and Mueller (2012) find no effect of Indonesian
attacks on insurance rates. Because of this, we do not expect to find significant effects of piracy
on trade along routes outside the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.
3 Conceptual framework
In the context of international trade flows, instances of piracy acts can be thought of as shocks
that increase shipping costs. In what follows, we model such shocks as a component of the
ad-valorem (iceberg) trade cost function and embed this in the standard gravity equation of bi-
lateral trade. The goal is to formalize the direct link between maritime piracy and international
10Insurance rates reportedly increased 4000 percent from 2008 to 2009 (Frump, 2009); between 82 and 97
seafarers have died during pirate attacks, in Somali detention, or during rescue operations (World Bank, 2013)
11For a discussion of how ships choose which, if any, defense measures to employ and the resulting changes in
the probability of successful pirate attacks given these choices see McDermott, Horn, Siwal, and Bohara (2014).
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trade, which helps us derive the econometric model and the identification strategy.
3.1 The Gravity Equation
Following the trade literature, we consider an N -country world with the representative consumer
of each country deriving utility from all available products according to a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) utility function. For simplicity of exposition, we disregard the time
dimension available in our panel dataset, and focus for now on characterizing trade at a given
point in time. Standard utility maximization subject to the budget constraint leads to the
following aggregate import demand function, dij, in country i for a product traded by country j :
dij =
(pij
Pi
)−σ Yi
Pi
, with Pi =
[ N∑
j=1
(pij)
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(1)
where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution across products, Yi is the aggregate expenditure
in country i (i.e., GDP), Pi is the CES price index and represents the aggregate price of the
entire consumption bundle, and pij is the import price paid in country i for a good produced
in country j. The import price includes the factory gate price, pj, and the ad-valorem (iceberg)
trade cost τij, such that:
pij = τijpj (2)
Summing the expenditure per product in country i across all the nj symmetric products
traded by the exporting country j results in the following equation for the volume of trade
between countries i and j:
Xij ≡ njpijdij = njYi
(τijpj
Pi
)1−σ
(3)
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we can use the goods market clearing con-
dition in the exporting country j (i.e., Yj =
∑N
i=1Xij = nj
∑N
i=1 pijdij), to substitute for the
endogenous factory price pj and for the number of products nj in equation (3), and get the
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familiar expression of the gravity equation:
Xij =
YiYj
YW
( τij
PiΠj
)1−σ
(4)
where YW =
∑N
i=1 Yi represents the world income. Πj is a function of all countries’ CES price
indexes that, under the assumption of symmetric bilateral trade costs, becomes equivalent to
the own CES price index Pj.
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The log of the gravity equation (4) defines the econometric model that is typically taken to
the data in order to estimate the impact of the trade costs τij on the volume of bilateral trade:
lnXij = −lnYW + lnYi + lnYj + (1− σ)τij − (1− σ)(lnPi + lnΠj) (5)
As pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), one empirical challenge in correctly
identifying a gravity equation of bilateral trade comes from the fact that the importer and
exporter price indexes, known as“multilateral resistance” terms, are unobservable. And because
they are a direct function of the bilateral trade costs and of countries’ income levels, their
omission from the regression model biases the main coefficients of interest. In our specific
case, the effect of maritime piracy on bilateral trade is going to be biased if omitting from
the estimation model the multilateral resistance terms. Our solution to this problem is to use
importer and exporter specific fixed effects to account for the multilateral resistance terms.
Adding also the time subscripts specific to the panel dimension of our dataset, the preferred
gravity equation specification can be written as:
lnXijt = αit + αjt + (1− σ)lnτijt + ijt (6)
where ijt represents an error term and accounts for measurement error in reported trade flows,
as well as for any unobserved determinants of bilateral trade.
12To be precise: Πj =
[∑N
i=1
Yi
YW
( τij
Pi
)1−σ]1/(1−σ)
. When τij = τji, then Πj = Pj .
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3.2 Piracy and the Trade Cost Function
We model the bilateral trade costs τijt as a function of the transportation cost between countries
i and j, as well as other implicit trade frictions known to affect their international trade. The
bilateral transportation cost is assumed to be determined by the geographic distance between
the two trading partners, Distij, and by the extent of maritime piracy on that trade route at
a given point in time, i.e., PirateRiskijt.
13 We denote the other trade frictions by a vector
Zij of bilateral variables, and consider factors such as common language and colonial linkage
indicators, as well as participation in bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.14 In summary,
we assume the following bilateral trade cost function:
τijt = f
(
Distij, P irateRiskijt, Zijt
)
(7)
We measure the risk of piracy in two ways. First, we follow the current literature in using
the log of the number of reported pirate attacks in a given year carried out in the proximity of
Somalia, Somali Attackst.
15 Unfortunately, this measure is not without problems, as it could
severely underestimate the impact of piracy on trade. One reason is reverse causality: the
increase in attacks may be partially due to an increase in available targets, something that is
quite possible given the significant increase in trade through the gulf of Aden (see figure 5).
Another reason is that shipper’s unobserved investments in protection (which increase trade
costs) could help reduce the number of recorded attacks.
For these reasons, we also use the variable Reacht, defined as the maximum extent of pirate
reach into the sea up until time t. This alternative measure of piracy risk has the advantage
of being largely free from these problems. We found no strong reason to suspect that pirates’
13For simplicity of exposition, we ignore the fact that successful hijackings destroy traded goods, and focus
only on the indirect trade costs; that is, piracy enters in equations (5) and (6) through τijt only.
14Common border is another variable typically included in gravity equations, but given our focus on trade
shipments transported by sea, in our sample we exclude bilateral trade flows between countries that share a
border as we expect a significant fraction of trade to be shipped by ground. See section 4 for a description of
the selected sample.
15In this paper, a pirate attack refers to any reported incident of piracy and armed robbery against ships,
with no distinction between actual and attempted attacks. Such data is collected, tabulated and disseminated
by the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB).
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geographic span of control has to increase at the same rate as the growth of regional trade. In
the same way, there is no strong reason to believe that in the absence of changes in aggregate
trade – beyond what is predicted by countries’ geography and rate of economic growth – the
reach of maritime piracy cannot vary over time. Our view is that the geographic expansion
of pirate activity is more likely an outcome of the safe haven provided by the position and
lawless state of Somalia, the increased availability of technology to pirates, and a slow reaction
and coordination of anti-pirate activities at international level. These conditions provided the
suitable environment for the existence and growth of pirate organizations, whose accumulated
capital and experience over time allowed them to expand.
In identifying the effect of piracy on transportation costs, we rely on two assumptions. First,
we assume that piracy increases shipping costs only if the predicted trade route between i and
j goes through pirate waters. Second, transport costs along pirate waters are monotonically
related with the intensity of pirate activity. Given the geography of pirate attacks around
Somalia, we assume that trade moves through pirate waters if the most likely trade route
(measured by minimum maritime distance between a pair of countries) passes through the Gulf
of Aden, or through the Indian Ocean. Letting Adenij be the indicator variable for trade routes
through the Gulf of Aden, and letting IOij be the equivalent for trade routes through the Indian
Ocean (see Appendix Table 8 for a tabulation of these two variables by country pair), the trade
cost function τijt for a given time period t can be written in log form as:
lnτijt = γ0lnDistij+γ1Adenij + γ2Adenij × PirateRiskt+
+γ3IOij + γ4IOij × PirateRiskt + δZijt + αt (8)
where the time fixed effect αt captures changes in global trade costs that are common to all
country pairs, including changes in the risk of piracy.
The ad-valorem tax imposed by piracy on trade moving through the Gulf of Aden is given
by γ2, while the tax on trade passing through the Indian Ocean is given by γ4. Note that due
to the Gulf of Aden being a narrow passage for ships, all trade transiting through it is subject
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to piracy. On the other hand, as piracy on the Indian Ocean is concentrated in the North West
part of the ocean, not all the trade through the Indian Ocean is occurring in pirate waters.
Thus, the average tax on trade through this area, captured by γ4, should be smaller than γ2.
Substituting the trade cost function into the gravity equation given by equation (6), we get:
lnXijt = αit + αjt + β0lnDistij+β1Adenij + β2Adenij × PirateRiskt+
+β3IOij + β4IOij × PirateRiskt + δZijt + ijt, (9)
where the coefficients βκ ≡ (1 − σ)γκ, with κ ∈ 0, 4, are reduced form coefficients. Thus, the
estimated reduced form effect of piracy on the volume of bilateral trade, given by β2, combines
the effect of piracy on the cost of transport (γ2), as well as the price elasticity of demand
(σ), which also represents the elasticity of substitution among the products in the consumption
basket. An implication of this underlying parameter structure is that for a given piracy shock to
the cost of shipping goods between two countries, the responsiveness in the volume of imports is
larger if the consumers in country i can easily find a substitute for goods produced by country
j (i.e., σ is large).
The trade effect of Somali piracy formalized in equation (9) is identified from the differen-
tial changes in the volume of bilateral trade across affected versus unaffected trade routes (i.e.,
difference-in-differences). The regression estimates correctly identify the reduction in trade due
to piracy provided that piracy does not affect country pairs trading outside of pirate waters.
A potential concern could arise if exporters increase trade with “safe” partners in response
to diminishing trade with “risky” partners, in which case β2 and γ2 would capture an upper
bound of the trade destruction effect of piracy. However, based on the theory framework, such
substitution patterns across trade partners are entirely driven by variation in the multilateral
resistance term (i.e., Pi in equation (1)). More specifically, when the bilateral cost of trading
with a particular country increases due to piracy, the importer price index increases as well,
lowering the relative price of imports from other countries. As a result, a larger expenditure
share gets allocated to products from lower trade cost, i.e., “safe” partners. Essential to our
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estimation, this reallocation of expenditures and increase in spending towards low trade cost
partners is proportional to the change in the importer price index. So, by controlling for the
multilateral resistance terms, we already account for substitution effects across trade part-
ners. The potential for substitution effects makes it essential to control for importer-year and
exporter-year fixed effects.
A second issue is that those costs associated with Somali piracy and affecting overall trade
are not going to be captured by the coefficient of interest in the regression equation (9). For
instance, some countries may reduce their expenditure share on all foreign goods because they
allocate national resources towards fighting piracy. If the fall is proportional across all trading
partners, this piracy-related trade cost is not captured in our regression estimate. Rather, the
trade reduction is absorbed by the country-year fixed effects. In that sense, our estimates of
the impact of Somali piracy on international trade capture a partial equilibrium effect.
In estimating equation (9), it is necessary to account for the fact that trade across different
regions grows at different rates for other exogenous reasons, and these growth rates could be
spuriously related to trade via the Gulf of Aden. We will address this omitted variable bias
problem by showing that our estimate of β2 is robust to the inclusion of a broad set of importer
and exporter controls, including importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. Finally, we use
the Cameron-Gelbach-Miller procedure to cluster standard errors by importer-year pairs to
capture any consumer-specific cyclical component in the error term (Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller, 2011). Alternative error structures do not change the significance of our results.
Tariff Equivalent of Maritime Piracy. If reliable data on bilateral trade costs τijt were
available for a large set of countries, we would estimate an extended version of the equation (8)
to directly find the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy, i.e., γˆ2. Unfortunately, this
approach is not feasible for us since the c.i.f./f.o.b. price ratios that could be calculated from the
COMTRADE data and used as proxies for iceberg trade costs are notoriously noisy (Hummels
and Lugovskyy, 2006). Instead, we exploit the structure of the gravity model together with
the estimated coefficients from equation (9) to make inferences about the magnitude of the
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ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy. That is, we calculate γˆ2 = βˆ2/(1− σˆ) by using
estimates from the trade literature for the elasticity of substitution σ.
4 Data
Pirate risk. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) via the ICC Commercial Crime Ser-
vices department collects information on all reported instances of actual and attempted piracy
and robbery. This represents the most comprehensive piracy data available for the period
1991-2011. For each reported event, the IMB lists the date, the geographic coordinates, the pi-
rates’ suspected country of origin, and the outcome from the episode (i.e., attempted boarding,
boarding, highjacking, etc.).16 From these data we construct our two explanatory variables:
Somali Attacks and Reach.
The first measure of piracy, Somali Attacks, is calculated by summing up all the attacks
initiated by suspected Somali pirates during each year of the sample, regardless of the as-
sailants’ nationality on record. Pirates’ nationalities are recorded with significant error, with
many attacks in the Gulf of Aden being attributed to a number of nationalities. In our main
specifications, we considered as “Somali” all pirate activities that took place in the Gulf of
Aden or in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean (refer to the Appendix Table A1 for
the detailed listing of pirate nationalities included in our definition of Somali piracy). However,
in one of our robustness exercises we experiment with a more narrowly defined measures of
Somali piracy, and show that it has no qualitatively different impact on our estimates.17
To construct the second measure of piracy, Reach, we use a GIS program to calculate the
geographic distance dit between the location of each attack i that took place at time t and the
closest point along the Somali coast. We define the geographic reach of pirates as the distance
16The data also includes the flag of the attacked vessel. Unfortunately, because of the widespread use of “flags
of convenience” and the ability of ships to avoid costly regulations by flying a foreign flag, this information is a
relatively poor proxy for either the countries involved in the trade or the location of the shipping firm Hoffmann,
Sa´nchez, and Talley (2004).
17We also generated a number of piracy variables associated with other regions of the world: West Africa,
the Indian Subcontinent, East Asia, Strait of Malacca, and Rest of World. The Appendix Table A1 indicates
how attacks from different nationalities are assigned to regions.
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of the furthest attack into the sea up to that time period, i.e., Reacht = maxs≤t{dis}. Since
this measure is sensitive to outliers (i.e., isolated events of local piracy across the East African
or Arabian peninsula coast), we consider only those attacks attributed to Somalian, Yemeni, or
Eritrean pirates. As the GPS coordinates of each attack were not reported by the IMB prior to
year 2000, the measure Reach is available only from that year onwards. For consistency, we limit
our main data analysis to the sample period 2000-2010 (although we exploit the information
on piracy attacks prior to 2000 in one robustness exercise).
It is possible that our two measures of piracy risk suffer from nonclassical measurement
error. For instance, it is possible that not all the incidents that actually happened over time
were reported by the victimized ships to the IMB. It is also possible that the degree of under-
reporting may have changed with sailors’ awareness of the Somali piracy problem. To the extent
that under-reporting is more of an issue in the early years of the sample, we would overestimate
the true increase in piracy over time. This will reduce both the magnitude and precision of the
regression coefficients, making our estimates a lower bound. A second potential problem is that,
lacking the GPS coordinates of pirate attacks prior to the year 2000, we could underestimate
the true geographic reach of pirates in the early part of the sample (if, for example, pirate
reach was extensive prior to 2000). However, we believe that this is unlikely to be the case,
as anecdotal evidence suggests Somali piracy was limited to the coastal regions throughout the
nineties and early 2000s (World Bank, 2013).
Bilateral import volumes. Our bilateral trade data comes from the COMTRADE database
provided by the United Nations. It specifies, for all 150 countries in the sample, the total value
of imports by product category and source country in a given year. Starting from the HS 6-digit
level of product differentiation, we construct two measures of bilateral trade: one that captures
the total value of trade, aggregated across all traded goods, and one that measures only trade
in “bulk” commodities – i.e., unprocessed and semi-processed agricultural and mineral goods.18
18The classification of goods into bulk commodities is available from Cristea, Hummels, Puzzello, and
Avetisyan (2013), and it is constructed at the HS 6-digit level of disaggregation using information from the
GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) database.
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Appendix Table A2 lists the HS 2-digit sectors, and the number of HS 6-digit products within
each sector that are considered bulk commodities and are included in our classification. Due
to their low value to weight ratio, these goods are more likely to travel by ship rather than air;
also, their vessels are easier for pirates to board and attack compared to containerized ships.
Trade routes and piracy exposure. We define trade between countries i and j to be
exposed to Somali piracy if the trading route connecting the two locations passes through
the Indian Ocean or the Gulf of Aden. Since the COMTRADE database does not include
information on maritime routes, these routes were imputed by mapping the shortest sea path
linking a trade country pair. We then determined whether the shortest path transits through
the Indian Ocean or the Gulf of Aden. Appendix Figure A1 indicates how countries were
assigned to regions while Appendix Table A3 indicates how region-pairs were assigned to trade
routes with pirate risks.
Control variables. The trade regressions estimated in this paper follow the gravity model
common in the trade literature and, as such, we rely on a standard set of regression control vari-
ables. The CEPII Gravity Dataset provides all gravity variables that are constant over time.19
For time varying variables, this publicly available dataset only goes to 2006. We use updated
values for population and GDP from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database20, and an
updated list of trading partners in a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) or in GATT/WTO using
information provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO).21
Sample country coverage. We restricted the COMTRADE data in the following way.
While the data are available from 1991, we restrict attention to the period 2000-2010, which
coincides with the beginning and expansion of piracy in the region. Due to ambiguity in deter-
mining some of the trade routes, we drop trade involving countries with multiple route profiles,
19Details about the data construction can be found in (Head, Mayer, and Ries, 2010). The data source is
available at: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp.
20http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx
21List of Regional Trade Agreements: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx
List of membership into the WTO: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/thewto e.htm
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which are the result of countries having ports on multiple seas (e.g., Russia, Saudi Arabia), or
being landlocked and without a clear sea trade route (e.g., Kazakhstan). These countries are
designated as “other” in Figure A1. We further remove all trade between neighboring countries,
as they mostly trade by land. Finally, we dropped Somalia from the sample as Somali trade is
likely to be endogenous with Somali pirate activity.
Summary statistics. Panel A of Table 1 indicates mean values in thousands of US dollars of
the imputed trade through the Gulf of Aden as compared to the rest of world trade, by country
pair. The annual value of trade between country pairs connected through the Gulf of Aden is,
on average, less than half of the value of trade between country-pairs that do linked through
that region. Trade in bulk goods makes up a small fraction of the total value of trade, both
through the Gulf of Aden and through other routes. That does not mean that bulk trade is
unimportant: since bulk trade has low value to weight ratio, it represents a much larger fraction
of ship tonnage. For instance, 23% of ships and 16% of tonnage transiting through the Suez
Canal in 2009 transported bulk products (Suez Canal Authority, 2013).22
[Table 1 Here]
Panel B provides summary statistics for some explanatory variables, including the number
of attacks and the furthest distance from the Somali coast to an attack. 31 percent of the
country-pairs used in the analysis have an imputed trade linkage through the Gulf of Aden.
The Suez Canal provides passage to 17 percent of the total trade and 9.8 percent of bulk trade
in our estimation sample. We use these values to calculate the total trade cost of piracy.
5 Estimation Results
Total imports. We begin with the analysis of the effects of piracy on the volume of total
bilateral imports. We estimate equation (9) and report in Table 2 six different fixed effects
specifications. Each specification gradually restricts the amount of data variation used for
22http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=3
18
model identification in order to contain the sources of omitted variable bias. In column 1,
we estimate a gravity model that includes only year fixed effects, which controls for cyclical
and secular changes in global trade. In the second column we add importer, exporter, and
year fixed effects. This specification controls for time-invariant country specific characteristics
such as geography, industrial specialization, or the average openness to international trade. To
better control for idiosyncratic shocks and differential growth rates across countries, column
3 includes importer-specific year dummies, while column 4 adds exporter-specific linear time
trends. To account for the fact that the 2008 recession caused a large decline in global trade,
with potentially differential consequences across countries, in column 5 we interact a “financial
crisis” dummy (set equal to one starting with year 2008) with the exporter-specific linear trend.
This specification presumes that the crisis had a different impact across countries, affected not
only their level of exports, but also their trend. The most demanding specification is presented
in column 6, which incorporates both importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. This spec-
ification accounts for year-by-year changes in import and export patterns that are specific to
each trading country but common across their bilateral trade partners. While demanding in
terms of data variation, this is our preferred specification as it accounts for the unobserved
multilateral resistance terms defined in the theory section.
Across all specifications, we are interested in the interaction between the annual Somali
pirate attacks and trade through the Gulf of Aden. We find a negative estimated coefficient on
this interaction term: bilateral trade through the Gulf of Aden falls relative to trade through
other routes in the years of high Somali pirate activity. The magnitude of the coefficient
decreases as we implement a more exhaustive structure of fixed effects, going from -0.07 (in
the estimation that only accounts for time-invariant country-specific characteristics) to -0.04
in the preferred specification reported in column 6. This coefficient change suggests that the
importer and exporter-specific time effects are essential in accounting for unobservable trade
determinants, whose omission would otherwise bias the piracy effect downward. The larger
estimates in absolute value that we find when using less stringent fixed effect models, such
as, for example, the Column 2 specification, are consistent with the results found in previous
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studies (e.g., World Bank, 2013; Bensassi and Mart´ınez-Zarzoso, 2012).
To quantify the impact of maritime piracy, we use the fact that pirate attacks grew by an
average of 48.1 percent per year from 2000-2010. Based on our preferred specification, this
implies a 0.481 ∗ (−0.04) = 0.019 or 1.9 percent annual reduction in bilateral imports traveling
through the Gulf of Aden due to piracy over that period, relative to imports shipped through
other routes. This result represent a significant reduction in trade. Using our imputed trade
routes, we estimate that between 2000 and 2010 an average of 1.3 trillion US$ passed through
the Gulf of Aden each year. A 1.9 percent reduction in imports through the Gulf of Aden thus
represents a trade loss of approximately $25 billion annually.23
Table 2 also reports coefficients on the interaction between piracy and trade through the
Indian Ocean. The estimated coefficients are negative, suggesting that piracy has a negative
impact on trade between countries in the Indian Ocean. However, the results are not statisti-
cally significant in our most rigorous specifications.24 Finally, the gravity control variables are
generally significant and have the expected sign. This is true throughout our analysis and, as
such, we report only the variables of interest in the remaining tables.
[Table 2 Here]
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (9) using the alternative measure of
piracy – i.e., pirate reach. Exploiting this alternative source of data variation in maritime
23In this study, we define the piracy-induced “loss of trade” as the reduction in the volume of imports from
a particular trade partner, which is caused by the increase in iceberg trade costs as a result of Somali pirate
activity. To be specific, if Xij defines the volume of imports of country i from country j traveling through the
Gulf of Aden, then an increase in PirateRisk between periods 0 and 1 cause a loss of trade given by:
LostTradeij = βˆ2
(PirateRisk1 − PirateRisk0
PirateRisk0
)
X0ij
where βˆ2 represents the estimated coefficient on the interaction term Adenij×PirateRiskt in equation (9), and
X0 = X1/(1 + βˆ2(%∆Piracy)). Our trade loss calculation is similar to Bensassi and Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2012).
It differs from the World Bank (2013) study as the latter calculates the trade-related cost of piracy by applying
the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of piracy to the volume of trade passing through the Gulf of Aden. The strategy
adopted by the World Bank thus does not take into account the demand response from an increase in import
prices due to piracy, which explains why the study arrives at a smaller estimated cost of piracy.
24We also ran each specification while including a dummy variable for trade traveling through the Strait of
Malacca and an interaction term with the number of attacks there. Generally, the coefficients on these variables
are not significant and their inclusion do not affect our other estimated coefficients.
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piracy, we again find strong significance in our variable of interest. As before, the coefficient
magnitude decreases as we include more stringent controls and fixed effects. These controls are
therefore important in preventing one from overstating the impact of piracy. The estimated
coefficient on the interaction between Indian Ocean trade and piracy remains negative, statis-
tically insignificant, and consistently smaller than the interaction between the Gulf of Aden
indicator and piracy. In terms of magnitude, the estimate in column 6 suggests that a 100
percent increase in pirate reach is associated with an 8.2 percent decrease in trade through the
Gulf of Aden, relative to other routes. Pirate reach increased an average of 21.3 percent per
year from 2000 to 2010. This corresponds to an average 1.7 percent trade reduction per year,
suggesting an estimated loss of trade through the Gulf of Aden of $22 billion annually.
[Table 3 Here]
Imports of bulk goods. We next assess how piracy has affected trade in bulk goods, the
category we expect to be most susceptible to piracy. We estimate Equation (9) and report
the results in Table 4. For conciseness, we only report the three more comprehensive fixed
effects specifications corresponding to columns 4 - 6 in Tables 2 and 3. In displaying the bulk
trade results, the first three columns use the number of pirate attacks as the measure of pirate
activity, while the last three columns use the pirate reach measure.
Focusing on the magnitude of the coefficients, we find larger estimated effects of piracy on
bulk trade relative to overall trade. In part this is driven by the larger elasticity of import
demand for homogenous goods, such as the bulk commodities. But this is also the result of a
higher responsiveness of trade costs to piracy risks, justified by the fact that ships carrying bulk
goods are more likely to be boarded and attacked. The estimate from the preferred specification
in column 3 of Table 4 implies a 4.1 percent reduction in trade per year from 2005-2010 as a
result of the 48.1 percent increase in pirate attacks annually in the Gulf of Aden, while column
6 suggests a 3.3 percent reduction due to the 21.3 percent annual increase in reach.
[Table 4 Here]
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Trade Costs. As discussed in section 3.2, we can infer the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of
maritime piracy from the gravity equation estimates. Focusing on the results for bulk trade
reported in column 3 of Table 4, and assuming an elasticity of substitution for bulk commodities
of 10, we calculate an ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy equal to 0.009 (which
corresponds to γˆ2 in equation (8)).
25 Given an average increase in piracy attacks by 48.1
percent per year, the implied increase in the iceberg trade cost is 0.45 percent on average.
Making the same comparison based on the piracy reach coefficients, the tariff equivalent
of maritime piracy derived from the estimates in Table 4 column 6 is 0.017 percent. At an
average annual increase in piracy reach by 21.3 percent, the estimate implies an increase in the
ad-valorem trade cost of 0.36 percent due to Somali piracy.
The inferred ad-valorem tariff equivalent of piracy turns out to be much smaller in magnitude
than the existing estimates in the literature, e.g., Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller (2012). However,
we think that the range of values that our calculated tariff equivalents fall into are more likely
to be representative for a larger group of traded goods.
5.1 Robustness
We next explore the robustness of our coefficients of interest to a number of alternative specifi-
cations. The results are reported in Table 5. Each reported specification follows the preferred
structure of fixed effects as used in column 6 of Table 2.
So far, we have assumed that the trade effect of pirate attacks and the attacks themselves
are observationally instantaneous. It may be the case, however, that it takes a significant
amount of time for trade to adjust to pirate events. In addition, pirate attacks and trade
happen throughout the year, and it is reasonable to assume that attacks in December of 2007
have more of an impact on trade in 2008 than in 2007. An alternative specification would thus
assume that attacks in a given year affect trade only in the following year, in which case piracy
25To calculate the tariff equivalent of maritime piracy, we divide the gravity equation estimate of -0.085 from
Column 3 in Table 4 by 1− σ = 1− 10 = −9. Note that the values for the elasticity of substitution σ typically
assumed in the trade literature range between 5 and 10 for all goods trade (see Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) among others). Given our focus on more homogenous product categories such as bulk commodities, we
have decided to experiment with the upper bound value of σ.
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would enter Equation (9) with a one year lag.
Panel A displays the results for our key variables of interest when we lag the piracy measure
by one year. The results are similar to our estimates using a contemporaneous measure of
attacks (reach), but they are smaller in magnitude and less significant. Further lags (2 years,
etc.) as were used in Bensassi and Mart´ınez-Zarzoso (2012) yielded insignificant results. The
significance of both contemporaneous and one year lagged attacks indicates that there is some
delay in trade responsiveness but the delay is much less than a full year.
In panel B we account for pirate activity in the Strait of Malacca in order to ensure that
our estimates for Somali piracy are not spuriously capturing other effects. Thus, we include a
dummy for trade passing through the Strait of Malacca, as well as an interaction term between
the Malacca dummy and the number of recorded attacks in Malacca. We take this exercise
a step further in panel C and include all piracy regions around the world and the associated
attack measures. Comparing these panels to the results in Table 2 indicates that our estimates
are robust to conditioning on piracy activity in other regions.
[Table 5 Here]
In panel D, we report estimates based on a more narrow definition of Somali attacks, which
includes only those countries used to create our reach variable. While this measure is in some
sense more precise, it may be inaccurate when measuring attacks because pirates’ country of
origin is based on the judgement of the attacked ship. In the early years of Somali piracy,
captains almost always simply chose the closest country as the likely initiator of the attack.
As Somali piracy became more well known, captains began to assume that attacks came from
Somali bases regardless of what country shores the ship was closest to when the attack occurred.
In panel E, we return to our baseline specification and definition of attacks, but limit our
sample to the period 2005-2010, years in which Somali pirates were the most active. With the
sample size reduction, we lose some precision; however, the results are broadly consistent with
the findings from the baseline sample. Finally, in our last robustness exercise reported in panel
F we expand our sample to include all available observations going back to 1991. Our piracy
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attacks measure becomes larger and more significant when early years are included.
In the online appendix accompanying this paper, we show a number of additional results. We
re-estimate the main specifications instrumenting one piracy measure with the other measure,
and using a poisson estimation strategy. We also report estimates based on a sample that
excludes the post-crisis period. These estimates broadly confirm the results of the paper.
Finally, we show that the trade-reducing effects of Somali piracy come from the intensive
margin of trade (i.e., adjustments in the volume of trade within a country pair), and not the
extensive margin (i.e., the probability of ceasing trade with certain trade partners).
5.2 Heterogeneity Analysis
We now explore the underlying heterogeneity of the estimated trade cost of piracy, starting
with differences in country-pair distance. There are a number of reasons to think that partners
trading through the Gulf of Aden and located in close proximity to one another should suffer
larger trade losses compared to more distant country pairs. This is because the distance travelled
through pirate waters represents a larger fraction of the total route distance. Furthermore, there
may be fewer or less cost-effective ocean routes that could be taken as feasible substitutes to
transiting via the Gulf of Aden. To study this issue, we estimate equation (9) on the subsample
of country pairs whose bilateral distance is below (above) the median distance. Panels A and B
of table 6 report the results. It is immediately clear that the estimated trade costs are associated
with short routes rather than long routes. The coefficient estimate on Aden × PirateRisk
is twice as large on short routes relative to the baseline specification from tables 2 and 3,
respectively, and they are strongly significant. Looking at bulk trade, the coefficient of interest
goes from -0.085 (using the number of attacks) in the full sample, to -0.300, and from -0.154
(using pirate reach) to -0.436. On the other hand, the coefficients estimated on the subsample of
long routes are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Clearly, proximity to pirate waters
matters.
We next consider the possibility that the “piracy tax” is unevenly distributed across poorer
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and richer countries. This could occur if, for instance, pirates target cargo ships transporting
goods originating from or destined to developing countries, perhaps because these ships employ
fewer defensive measures. An alternative, maybe more realistic scenario, is that pirates do
not target, and shipping companies commingle cargo from different countries. In this case, we
should not observe heterogeneity in our estimates based on income. In panel C and D, we run
regressions on country pairs where at least one partner is below (panel C) or above (panel D)
the median level of income observed in our data sample. Our estimates of the effect of piracy
on total trade remain negative but lose precision, while the estimates for bulk trade remain
consistently negative and significant. More importantly, the estimated coefficients remain very
similar across the two panels, suggesting a lack of an income gradient.26
5.3 Distribution of the Burden of Piracy
A final consideration must be made about the distribution of the trade-related cost burden asso-
ciated with Somali piracy across countries. Using annual data averaged over the sample period
2000-2010, we have constructed estimates of the annual value of lost trade for all the countries
in our database. Table 7 reports the estimates for the most affected countries. Columns 1 and 2
provide country level statistics on the average income and value of trade traveling through the
Gulf of Aden, while column 3 shows the share of total trade going through the Gulf of Aden.
Column 4 reports the monetary value of the annual loss of trade due to piracy, where we use
the estimates from Table 2 for the calculation. Column 5 reports the lost trade as a fraction of
total trade. The last column computes what fraction of the global cost of piracy is accounted
for by a particular country, where the global cost is estimated to average about $24.8 billion
loss in trade per year. As mentioned, losses are slightly lower if we use the more conservative
estimates from the regressions in table 3; nonetheless, the discussion below is not particularly
sensitive to these differences.
Panel A of table 7 lists the countries with the highest value of trade lost through piracy as
26Alternative ways of cutting the data, for instance by considering the income of sender only or importer
only, lead to similar results.
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a share of their total trade. Not surprisingly, all but one of the countries in this list are located
in the Indian Ocean and trade heavily with Europe or the Mediterranean region. At the upper
end of the distribution, fully 2/3 of trade to Mayotte, and half of total trade of Qatar, Eritrea
and Kuwait are estimated to go through Aden. Yet, as a fraction of total trade, the impact
of piracy remains fairly limited (column 3). No country loses more than 2% of annual trade
due to piracy, and only the three most exposed countries lose more than 1%. In addition, since
the countries in the list are generally “small” countries, the value of their losses represents only
a small fraction of the total cost (column 5).27 In monetary terms, losses for the countries in
the list range from 1 million dollars per year to 230 million per year, except for India and the
United Arab Emirates, who have estimated losses of more than one billion dollars per year.
An alternative way to illustrate the way in which trade losses are distributed across countries
is to rank countries by the absolute value of trade lost due of piracy. This is reported in panel
B of table 7. The countries dominating this list have significantly lower shares of trade moving
through the Gulf of Aden. However, being large countries, their value of trade makes up a
large share of total trade transiting through the Gulf of Aden. Looking at the piracy problem
in this way, it is clear that the burden of piracy falls very heavily on one trading block, i.e., the
European Union. We estimate annual losses approximating $11 billion dollars, which represents
a fully 44 percent of the global burden of piracy.28 China, Japan, the UAE, and India make
up the remaining countries with costs over $1 billion. Overall, 70 percent of the global cost of
piracy accrue to only five countries and the EU.
Table 7 highlights an important fact about piracy: while the estimated costs are not par-
ticularly large on a global scale and represent a very small share of trade for any country in
the world, the monetary value of the losses are large and concentrated on few countries–most
prominently, the European Union. It is thus unsurprising that the anti-piracy response has
been led by countries on this list–the EU and US (through NATO), India, and China.
27The list excludes a possibly important large country, Saudi Arabia, for which we could not precisely estimate
partnerships affected by piracy.
28Within the EU, the burden for Germany is $2.5 billion, for the UK is $1.7 billion, for France is $1.3 billion,
for the Netherlands is $1.2 billion. Italy, Spain and Belgium have burdens ranging between $700 million and $1
billion, with the remaining countries contributing $300 million or less per year.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the extent to which maritime insecurity affects international trade
flows by exploiting the dramatic increase in piracy risk around Somalia. Between 2000 and
2010, pirate attacks increased seven-fold around the gulf of Aden and the Somali coast, with
increasingly daring highjackings taking place further and further away from Somalia. The
paper provides evidence that the escalating maritime insecurity did cause a reduction in trade
volumes, suggesting that Somali piracy remains a global problem affecting countries trading
through the Suez Canal.
Using a panel data set combining information on bilateral volumes of trade and on reported
pirate attacks, we identify the effect of piracy on trade through a difference in difference strategy.
Our empirical model compares the trade response to changes in the risk of piracy between
countries trading through pirate waters relative to those pairs of countries trading through
waters free from Somali pirates. Using two alternative measures of piracy risk–the number of
attacks carried out by Somali pirates, and the geographic reach of pirates off the Somali coast–
we find that piracy in the Gulf of Aden reduces the volume of trade between the affected country
pairs by an average of 1.9 percent per year from 2000-2010, with larger and more significant
effects for trade in bulk commodities.
We estimate that this reduction in trade represents a loss of $22 to $25 billion per year.
This is a large number in relation to the benefits gained by pirates (estimated by the World
Bank (2013) to be about $50 million per year), and it is somewhat larger than the existing $18
billion estimate from the World Bank of the trade effects of piracy. Our larger estimates are
the result of addressing an important limitation in the existing literature, namely the presence
of omitted variable biases, the endogeneity of pirate attack incidents, the use of more precise
measurement of piracy risk, and a slightly different way of measuring costs that take into full
account demand responses to the piracy threat. While these trade costs remain small relative
to the total flow of trade, we find that these costs are not evenly distributed, with a handful of
countries shouldering a great majority of the costs.
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7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: The incidence of Pirate Attacks
Note: The geographic locations of pirate attacks that occurred during the period 1991-2010 are represented by
dark dots. Light colored dots identify the main maritime ports by country.
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Figure 2: Total Number of Pirate Attacks by Year and Region
Note: The time series displays the total number of attacks per year assigned to Somalia or the Strait of
Malacca as documented in the Appendix table A1.
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Figure 3: The Geographic Reach of Somali Attacks Over Time
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Note: The figure illustrates the expansion of maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa near Somalia (drawn in
black contour). Each black dot corresponds to the location of individual pirate attacks. The concentric sea
zones off the coast of Somalia mark the 500 and 1000 km borderlines respectively.
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Figure 4: The Maximum Geographic Reach of Somali Pirates
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Note: The data display documents the construction and the variation in piracy reach over time. The dashed line
corresponds to the monthly number of attacks attributed to Somali pirates (following the assignment described
in the Appendix table A1). The continuous line traces the distance (in kilometers) to the furthest offshore point
where a pirate attack was reported in a given month. Piracy reach is defined as the largest distance that was
ever traveled by pirates to date, and is represented in the graph by the long dashed line.
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Figure 5: The Importance of the Gulf of Aden as Transit Area for Global Trade
Note: The figure illustrates the fraction of global trade (by value) that is potentially exposed to the risk of
maritime piracy over time. This fraction is calculated based on the set of country pairs for which the shortest
maritime route goes through the Gulf of Aden and/or the Suez Canal. For comparison, we also plot the number
of pirate attacks in that region over time.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Bilateral Measures
Gulf of Aden Trade Other Trade
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Log of Total Trade (thousand $) 7.30 4.02 7.88 4.13
Log of Bulk Trade (thousand $) 5.44 3.33 5.99 3.55
Share of Bulk Trade in Total Trade (%) 0.03 0.06
Average Distance (km), Total Trade 8,434 3,388 6,737 4,354
Average Distance (km), Bulk Trade 8,346 3,085 6,231 4,447
Panel B: Explanatory variables
Mean St. Dev.
Somali Attacks (per year) 82.31 75.42
Log of Somali Attacks (per year) 4.01 0.88
Reach (km) 883.21 449.14
Log of Reach (km) 6.64 0.56
Log of Importer GDP (billion $) 3.92 2.24
Log of Importer Population (million) 2.33 1.88
Log of Importer GDP per Capita (thousand $) 1.60 1.57
Aden Route Indicator 0.32 0.47
Share of Total Trade through Gulf of Aden (%) 16.95 1.42
Share of Bulk Trade through Gulf of Aden (%) 9.83 0.54
Notes:
1. All the nominal values – trade volumes, GDP and per-capita GDP – are measured in US Dollars. Given the
overlap in the set of countries that are exporters and importers, we omit exporter-specific summary statistics.
2. The volume of trade that goes through the Gulf of Aden is determined based on the set of country pairs for
which the shortest maritime route transits that region.
3. The categories of products that are classified as bulk are described in the Appendix table A3.
4. Sample statistics calculated after dropping observations as described in section 4.
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Table 2: Effect of Somali Piracy on Total Bilateral Trade
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aden Dummy 0.030 0.319*** 0.340*** 0.206** 0.202** 0.198**
[0.118] [0.102] [0.090] [0.093] [0.094] [0.096]
Aden × Somali Attacks -0.054** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.042* -0.041* -0.040*
[0.025] [0.020] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024]
Ind. Ocean Dummy 0.313* -0.407*** -0.369*** 0.133 0.225* 0.294**
[0.166] [0.151] [0.098] [0.116] [0.128] [0.146]
Ind. Ocean × Somali Attacks 0.039 0.126*** 0.117*** -0.010 -0.033 -0.050
[0.037] [0.031] [0.023] [0.028] [0.031] [0.035]
Log Population Importer 1.018*** 1.117***
[0.023] [0.247]
Log Per-Capita GDP Importer 1.023*** 0.662***
[0.035] [0.075]
Log Population Exporter 1.181*** -0.561*** -0.600** -0.060 -0.069
[0.016] [0.209] [0.233] [0.624] [0.766]
Log Per-Capita GDP Exporter 1.261*** 0.459*** 0.454*** 0.107 0.070
[0.019] [0.042] [0.051] [0.080] [0.100]
Log Distance -1.132*** -1.564*** -1.560*** -1.561*** -1.560*** -1.561***
[0.043] [0.058] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Common Language 0.877*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.683***
[0.076] [0.075] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Colonial Ties 0.884*** 1.081*** 1.084*** 1.083*** 1.084*** 1.085***
[0.125] [0.128] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042]
Common Colonizer (post 1945) 0.702*** 0.697*** 0.696*** 0.695*** 0.695*** 0.694***
[0.109] [0.089] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
RTA 0.687*** 0.345*** 0.372*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 0.365***
[0.071] [0.080] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034]
Both WTO 0.416*** 0.226*** 0.230*** 0.128** 0.157*** 0.196***
[0.062] [0.057] [0.044] [0.055] [0.058] [0.068]
ACP - EU -0.078 0.022 0.027 0.006 0.008 0.006
[0.110] [0.113] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045]
Fixed Effects Specification: Year Importer Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year
Exporter Exporter Exp×Trend Exp×Trend Exp-Year
Year Exp×Crisis
Observations 154,781 154,781 154,781 154,781 154,781 154,781
R-squared 0.680 0.698 0.699 0.703 0.703
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered by importer-year in brackets.
Note: The reported results correspond to a gravity model of trade specified by equation (9). The estimation sample
covers worldwide bilateral trade over the period 2000-2010. The dependent variable represents the total bilateral
volume of imports (in logs). The Aden and Indian Ocean dummy variables are equal to 1 whenever the shortest
maritime route connecting two trading partners goes through the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean, respectively. Somali
Attacks are the total number of Somali pirate attacks occurring within the calendar year; for specifics on assignment
of attacks to Somali pirates see Appendix 1. All other regression variables are standard gravity variables, whose
description is provided in the paper.
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Table 3: Effect of Somali Piracy on Total Bilateral Trade (Reach Measure)
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aden 0.543* 0.947*** 1.030*** 0.640*** 0.639*** 0.582**
[0.293] [0.247] [0.222] [0.238] [0.239] [0.241]
Aden × Somali Reach -0.110** -0.137*** -0.150*** -0.091** -0.091** -0.082**
[0.044] [0.035] [0.033] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036]
Ind. Ocean Dummy -0.153 -1.553*** -1.482*** 0.265 0.253 0.444
[0.441] [0.390] [0.238] [0.353] [0.353] [0.375]
Ind. Ocean × Somali Reach 0.094 0.249*** 0.239*** -0.026 -0.024 -0.053
[0.066] [0.058] [0.035] [0.053] [0.053] [0.056]
Fixed Effects Specification: Year Importer Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year
Exporter Exporter Exp×Trend Exp×Trend Exp-Year
Year Exp×Crisis
Observations 154,781 154,781 154,781 154,781 154,781 154,781
R-squared 0.680 0.698 0.699 0.703 0.703
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered by importer-year in brackets.
Note: The reported results correspond to a gravity model of trade specified by equation (9). The estimation sample
covers worldwide bilateral trade over the period 2000-2010. The dependent variable represents the total bilateral
volume of imports (in logs). The Aden and Indian Ocean dummy variables are equal to 1 whenever the shortest
maritime route connecting two trading partners goes through the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean, respectively. The
Somali pirate reach is calculated as the furthest distance from the location of a Somali pirate attack to the closest
port on the Somali coast. Standard gravity equation variables – i.e., population and per-capita GDP for both trade
partners, distance, common language, colonial ties, common colonizer, RTA, both WTO, ACP-EU – are included in
all specifications but omitted from the table.
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Table 4: Effect of Somali Piracy on Bulk Trade
Dependent Variable: Log of Bulk Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Piracy measure: Attacks Attacks Attacks Reach Reach Reach
Aden Dummy 0.341*** 0.306** 0.284** 1.052*** 1.066*** 0.965***
[0.128] [0.131] [0.134] [0.328] [0.327] [0.331]
Aden × Piracy Measure -0.100*** -0.092*** -0.085*** -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.154***
[0.031] [0.032] [0.033] [0.050] [0.049] [0.050]
Ind. Ocean Dummy -0.425** -0.289 -0.200 -0.204 -0.202 -0.075
[0.189] [0.202] [0.220] [0.519] [0.519] [0.538]
Ind. Ocean × Piracy Measure 0.031 -0.003 -0.026 -0.015 -0.015 -0.035
[0.049] [0.052] [0.057] [0.080] [0.080] [0.083]
Fixed Effects Specification: Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year Imp-Year
Exp×Trend Exp×Trend Exp-Year Exp×Trend Exp×Trend Exp-Year
Exp×Crisis Exp×Crisis
Observations 82,362 82,362 82,362 82,362 82,362 82,362
R-squared 0.435 0.437 0.435 0.437
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered by importer-year in brackets.
Note: The reported results correspond to a gravity model of trade specified by equation (9). The estimation sample
covers worldwide bilateral trade over the period 2000-2010. The dependent variable represents the bilateral volume of
imports of bulk commodities (in logs). Details on the classification of traded goods are provided in the Appendix table
A3. The Aden and Indian Ocean dummy variables are equal to 1 whenever the shortest maritime route connecting
two trading partners goes through the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean, respectively. Somali piracy is measured either
by the number of attacks in a year, or by pirates’ reach (as in Table 3). Standard gravity equation variables – i.e.,
population and per-capita GDP for both trade partners, distance, common language, colonial ties, common colonizer,
RTA, both WTO, ACP-EU – are included in all specifications but omitted from the table.
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Table 5: Robustness Checks
Dependent Var.: Log of Total Imports Log of Bulk Imports
Aden Dummy Aden × Piracy Aden Dummy Aden ×Piracy
Panel A: One year lags
Lag Somali Attacks 0.195* -0.042 0.206 -0.071*
[0.102] [0.027] [0.144] [0.038]
Lag Reach 0.542** -0.078** 0.897*** -0.147***
[0.228] [0.035] [0.329] [0.051]
Panel B: Malacca Attacks Included
Somali Attacks 0.201** -0.044* 0.284** -0.087**
[0.098] [0.023] [0.138] [0.034]
Reach 0.628** -0.091** 0.961*** -0.154***
[0.247] [0.037] [0.341] [0.052]
Panel C: Attacks from All Regions Included
Somali Attacks 0.202** -0.044** 0.279** -0.086**
[0.098] [0.024] [0.142] [0.035]
Reach 0.625** -0.090** 0.971*** -0.156***
[0.247] [0.037] [0.349] [0.053]
Panel D: Attacks from Somalia, Yemen, Eritrea
Somali Attacks 0.102* -0.023 0.114 -0.061**
[0.053] [0.017] [0.073] [0.024]
Panel E: 2005-2010 sample
Somali Attacks 0.176 -0.032 0.261 -0.075
[0.176] [0.038] [0.256] [0.055]
Reach 0.719 -0.097 1.064 -0.162
[0.703] [0.099] [1.007] [0.142]
Panel F: 1991-2010 sample
Somali Attacks 0.341*** -0.077*** 0.474*** -0.132***
[0.056] [0.015] [0.078] [0.021]
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered by importer-year in brackets.
Note: Each row and pair of columns represents a separate gravity model estimation given by equation (9),
including importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the bilateral import volume
of all goods (first two columns) or bulk commodities (second two columns). Panel B includes but omits from
the table the Malacca route dummy and Malacca × pirate attacks in Malacca. Panel C includes but does not
report Malacca route dummy, Malacca × pirate attacks in Malacca, Far East route dummy, Far East × Far
East pirate attacks, West Africa route dummy, and West Africa × West Africa attacks. Piracy reach measures
for non-Somali piracy could not be calculated, therefore, for the rows dealing with reach in panels B and C,
number of pirate attacks is includes for all regions other than Somlia. Panel D redefines Somali attacks to only
include attacks attributed to Somalia, Yemen, or Eritrea, reach could not be calculated with these countries
included and as such it has not been reported. Attack location information was not available before 2000, thus,
reach is not reported for the 1991-2010 sample. All specifications include controls for Indian Ocean dummy,
Indian Ocean × piracy measure, distance, common language, colonial ties, common colonizer, RTA, both WTO,
and ACP-EU, which are not reported.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity Analysis for the Estimated Effect of Somali Piracy
Dependent Var.: Log of Total Imports Log of Bulk Imports
Aden Dummy Aden × Piracy Aden Dummy Aden ×Piracy
Panel A: Shortest 50% of Routes
Somali Attacks 0.123 -0.070* 0.905*** -0.292***
[0.155] [0.039] [0.276] [0.070]
Reach 0.718* -0.132** 2.635*** -0.436***
[0.384] [0.058] [0.698] [0.107]
Panel B: Longest 50% of Routes
Somali Attacks -0.086 -0.045 -0.228 0.021
[0.143] [0.034] [0.225] [0.058]
Reach 0.216 -0.073 -0.333 0.028
[0.378] [0.057] [0.562] [0.086]
Panel C: At Least One Partner in Poorest 50%
Somali Attacks 0.163 -0.028 0.493*** -0.100**
[0.105] [0.026] [0.169] [0.042]
Reach 0.477* -0.064 1.266*** -0.176***
[0.261] [0.039] [0.423] [0.064]
Panel D: At Least One Parnter in Wealthiest 50%
Somali Attacks 0.180 -0.035 0.244 -0.103**
[0.130] [0.033] [0.198] [0.050]
Reach 0.462 -0.064 1.028** -0.180**
[0.333] [0.050] [0.503] [0.077]
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. Standard errors clustered by importer-year in brackets.
Note: Each row and pair of columns represents a separate gravity model estimation given by equation (9),
including importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the bilateral import
volume of all goods (first two columns) or bulk commodities (second two columns). Subsamples in panels
A and B are calculated using the sample median distance of 7,117 km, corresponding approximately
to the distance between India and Ireland. Rich/Poor classification for Panels C and D are based on
GNP per capita values for year 2001 provided by the World Bank. All specifications include controls
for Indian Ocean dummy, Indian Ocean × piracy measure, distance, common language, colonial ties,
common colonizer, RTA, both WTO, and ACP-EU, which are not reported.
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Table 7: Distribution of Piracy Burden across Countries
Trade Trade Share Annual Loss Annual Loss as Fraction of
Country GDP via Suez via Suez in Trade Share of Trade Global Loss
(billions) (millions) (percentage) (millions) (percentage) (percentage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Most affected countries as fraction of total trade lost
1 Mayotte - 318 0.65 6 1.25 0.03
2 Qatar 54 6,440 0.53 126 1.03 0.51
3 Eritrea 1 229 0.53 4 1.02 0.02
4 Kuwait 87 7,660 0.49 150 0.95 0.60
5 Iran 190 11,600 0.48 227 0.93 0.92
6 Seychelles 1 223 0.48 4 0.92 0.02
7 Djibouti 1 301 0.47 6 0.91 0.02
8 UAE 287 59,000 0.46 1,157 0.89 4.66
9 Bahrain 15 2,270 0.40 45 0.78 0.18
10 India 884 58,400 0.40 1,145 0.76 4.61
11 Burundi 1 98 0.38 2 0.74 0.01
12 Niger 4 329 0.36 6 0.70 0.03
13 Sudan 30 2,170 0.35 43 0.68 0.17
14 Rwanda 3 196 0.35 4 0.67 0.02
15 Ethiopia 17 1,650 0.34 32 0.66 0.13
Panel B: Most affected countries, in absolute value of lost trade
1 EU 12,972 557,763 0.04 10,937 0.08 44.01
2 China 2,860 102,000 0.17 2,000 0.33 8.05
3 Japan 4,590 66,600 0.13 1,306 0.26 5.26
4 UAE 287 59,000 0.46 1,157 0.89 4.66
5 India 884 58,400 0.40 1,145 0.76 4.61
6 United States 12,420 44,600 0.03 875 0.06 3.52
7 Korea, Rep. 782 33,500 0.13 657 0.24 2.64
8 Hong Kong 186 30,200 0.10 592 0.20 2.38
9 Singapore 139 29,100 0.15 571 0.29 2.30
10 Australia 740 28,200 0.24 553 0.47 2.23
11 Turkey 466 23,000 0.22 451 0.42 1.81
12 Taiwan 323 18,400 0.14 361 0.26 1.45
13 Malaysia 151 14,900 0.14 292 0.27 1.18
14 Thailand 207 14,400 0.12 282 0.24 1.14
15 Czech Republic 135 12,200 0.16 239 0.30 0.96
Note: The reported trade shares are constructed based on the estimation dataset, which excludes intra-regional trade
and certain trade routes (see the Appendix table A3). All nominal values are provided in US dollars. In column 4, the
value of trade lost is calculated from the value of total trade going through the Gulf of Aden (column 2) multiplied by
the estimated loss of trade, which is 0.019 percent per year. Column 5 values are calculated as the amount of trade
lost per year (column 4) divided by the amount of total trade in the sample. Column 6 values are calculated as the
amount of trade lost (column 5) divided by the sum of all trade losses (computed to be equal to $24.85 billion per
year).
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8 Data Appendix
Table A1: Assignment of Pirate Attacks to Geographical Areas
Somalia and Indian Ocean (1186 total attacks, 56 per year)
Somalia, Mozambique, Djibuti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Oman, Tanzania, Yemen.
Malacca Strait and South East Asia (2038 total attacks, 97 per year)
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malacca Strait, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore
Strait, Thailand.
West and Central Africa (680 total attacks, 33 per year)
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Togo, Zaire (DRC).
Far East (441 total attacks, 21 per year)
China/Hong Kong/Macau, East China Sea, Hong Kong/Luzon/Hainan (HLH), Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, South China Sea, Taiwan, Vietnam.
Indian Subcontinent (689 total attacks, 33 per year)
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka.
Rest of World (unassigned) (723 total attacks, 34 per year)
Albania, Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Caribbean, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Location not available, Malta, Martinique,
Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pacific Ocean, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Salvador,
Trinidad and Tobago,Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela.
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Table A2: Bulk Goods Classification
Description HS code HS code
2-digit 6 digit
Live Trees and Other Plants 06 9
Coffee, Tea, Spices 09 26
Cereals 10 14
Oil Seeds, Grains, Seeds, Medical Plants 12 39
Vegetable Plaiting Materials & Products 14 1
Cocoa And Cocoa Preparations 18 1
Food Industry Residues & Waste 23 2
Tobacco And Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes 24 3
Salt, Sulfur, Earth & Stone Lime, Cement Plaster 25 63
Ores, Slag & Ash 26 24
Mineral Fuels, Oils, Waxes, Bituminous Substances 27 8
Fertilizers 31 1
Cotton, including Yarn and Woven Fabric 52 1
Vegetable Textile Fibers; Yarn and Woven Fabric 53 7
Pearls, Stones, Precious Metals, Coins 71 4
Note: The table reports which HS 2-digit categories includes products that are traded as bulk commodities.
The classification of products into bulk is available from (Cristea, Hummels, Puzzello, and Avetisyan, 2013),
and it is constructed at the HS 6-digit level of disaggregation using information from the GTAP (Global Trade
Analysis Project) database. The numbers reported in the third column indicate the number of HS 6-digit
products considered to be traded in bulk within each HS 2-digit category.
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Table A3: Trade Region Pairs by Route
Route Gulf of Aden Malacca Indian Ocean Far East Rest of Africa
Pirate threat Somali Malacca Somali Far East West and
Indian Subcont. Central African
From To
Europe 1 0 0 0 0
North America 1 0 0 0 0
Rest of Africa 1 0 0 0 1
East Africa Indian subcontinent 0 0 1 0 0
Malacca 0 1 1 0 0
Far East 0 1 1 1 0
Europe 0 0 0 0 1
Southern Africa Rest of Africa 0 0 0 0 1
Indian subcontinent 0 0 1 0 0
Malacca 0 1 1 0 0
Far East 0 1 1 1 0
North America 0 0 0 0 1
Western South America 0 0 0 0 1
Rest of Africa Eastern South America 0 0 0 0 1
Europe 0 0 0 0 1
Indian subcontinent 1 0 1 0 1
Malacca 1 1 1 0 1
Far East 1 1 1 1 1
North America 1 0 1 0 0
Western South America 0 0 1 1 0
Indian Eastern South America 1 0 1 0 0
Subcontinent Europe 1 0 1 0 0
Malacca 0 1 1 0 0
Far East 0 1 1 1 0
North America 0 1 0 1 0
Western South America 0 1 0 1 0
South East Asia Eastern South America 0 1 0 1 0
Europe 1 1 1 0 0
Far East 0 1 0 1 0
North America 0 0 0 1 0
Far East Western South America 0 0 0 1 0
Eastern South America 0 0 0 1 0
Europe 1 1 1 1 0
Note: The table reports all the worldwide bilateral trade flows included in our estimation sample that are
subject to piracy threats in any part of the world. The indicator 1 identifies the routes along which ships are
at risk of maritime piracy occurring in the region described by the appropriate column. Many region-pairs,
including North America to Europe, are not included in this table. Region pairs that are not explicitly listed
face no pirate threat along their imputed route.
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Figure A1: Trade Region Assignments
Europe
Other
Other
North America
Europe
Other
Rest of Africa
East Africa
South Africa
South Asia
Far East
Malacca
WestSouth America
EastSouth America
Note: The shaded trade regions were designed to encompass all countries that would use similar sea routes to trade with countries in another trade
region. The countries labeled as Other have been dropped from the sample, mainly due to conflicts in assigning a unique trading route.
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